While second-party punishment is suitable in small groups, third-party punishment is much more common in large societies, where it is generally recognized as a social norm enforcement device that may guarantee social stability. However, in large societies, the presence of a potential additional third-party punisher who observes the norm violation and decides to intervene becomes more probable. The question arises as to whether third-party punishment would be robust with respect to an enlargement of the pool of potential altruistic punishers, namely the introduction of a second potential punisher. The relevance of this question is evident because, should the case be that the presence of several potential third-party punishers activates free-riding attitudes, third-party punishment may decline or even collapse altogether. In our paper we compare, by means of an economic experiment, punishment by a single third party (the Stand-Alone case) with punishment by third parties (In-Group environment). Shifting punishment choices into this "enlarged environment" allows us to study, in a systematic way, the complex relationship between the punisher's expectations about her/his peer's punishment decisions and her/his own punishment choices. Our data suggest that individual punishers are heterogeneous as to their individual punishment characteristics and the presence of a second punisher affects their choices to a certain extent. Consequently, the implementation of voluntary punishment depends on the distribution of types within the population. This result allows both to put into discussion the extreme emphasis devoted to voluntary third-party punishment as the "golden cornerstone" of spontaneous social order and to explain why large developed societies need institutional legal systems as the root of stability.
INTRODUCTION
Most societies and legal systems rely on punishment as a means of responding to rule violations. Punishment, broadly defined, connotes a costly activity aimed at inflicting a "bad" on someone because of his/her misconduct or wrongdoing. To a large extent, this punishment is "third-party punishment" in the sense that the actual punishment is not meted out by the injured party, but instead by someone who, as such, is unaffected by the deed. While in the legal context this "punisher" is typically an assigned agent, other individuals -both direct victims and third parties -contribute to the task of law enforcement in a variety of ways; for instance, by initiating public penal proceedings. Direct individually-provided sanctioning is more common in the context of social rules. As an example, one may think of parents "punishing" a child who has been misbehaving, workers sanctioning a colleague who has shirked her/his responsibilities, or a whistleblower hotline which allows employees to initiate in-house investigations. In a broader context, one could think of the "casting of the first stone" by the crowd, the lynching of a murderer by the mob, or the bounty offered to catch a bandit or to kill the world's most-wanted terrorist. The split between voluntary and institutional punishment has varied throughout history, with a higher reliance on the former in early societies. To the extent that the underlying rule violation caused only focused harm, punishment was typically entrusted solely to this victim; to the extent that the underlying act was "victimless," or generated dispersed harm, single individual punishment, though feasible, was replaced by collective enforcement, whereby group members were obligated to contribute to joint punishment efforts. Two major deficiencies of this system contributed, inter alia, to the shift towards institutionalized third-party punishments: on the one hand, the questionable stability of individually provided punishment in group settings, and on the other hand, potentially excessive punishment.
Given the paramount importance of punishment, in all of its variants, for purposes of law abidance and social stability, it comes as no surprise that it has, in all of its forms, attracted the attention of many disciplines beyond law, most notably economics. Starting with the pioneering work of Becker (1968) , economists have analyzed punishment in different contexts, covering topics such as regulation (Bose, 1995) and tax evasion (see Slemrod and Ytzhaki for a survey, 2002) . More recently, behavioral and experimental economists have dealt with a more basic and ancestral type of sanction, namely, the phenomenon of voluntary punishment. Voluntary punishment exists in two forms, as "secondparty punishment" (SPP) and as "third-party punishment" (TPP). In cases of second-party punishment, the potential punisher is the "victim" -typically the other party in an "exchange relationship." An already-established body of experimental literature deals with this phenomenon, the seminal work on SPP being Güth et al. (1982) . This article examines "irrational punishment" in the framework of what is called the "Ultimatum Game" (UG), i.e. an experimental setting in which a Proposer decides how to divide her/his initial endowment with a Receiver. Whereas it is the Proposer's task to propose the respective split, the Receiver may decide whether or not to accept a positive offer. If s/he rejects the proposed split, neither party receives anything. Empirical evidence shows that the Receivers prefer to reject positive offers, which they consider unfair, thus sacrificing the value of their own share for "punishing" the Proposers for their unfair offers. Another variant of this "victim-as-punisherapproach" is Fehr and Gächter (2000; 2002) , who, analyzing costly individual punishment in the framework of an exchange relationship in public good settings, show that the presence of a punishment mechanism generates high cooperation levels in these public goods game settings. Subsequent articles (including, among others, Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007; Casari and Luini, 2009; Nikiforakis, 2008) p r o v i d e a m o r e d e t a i l e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e characteristics of sanctions (in the context of peer punishment): sanctions increase with perceived unfairness, they show the characteristics of standard ordinary goods (their demand diminishes when the cost increases), and they are comparable to private goods due to their emotional nature.
However, as argued in Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) , the application of SPP is by definition limited, because it exclusively focuses on punishment among subjects who are directly involved in a given situation. Indeed, "if only second parties imposed sanctions, a very limited number of social norms could be enforced because norm violations often do not directly hurt other people" (2004:64) . Typically, the stability of a social norm requires enforcement by impartial third parties, i.e., the intervention of subjects who are not the direct target of norm violations. This motivates the study of TPP, i.e., the altruistic behavior ("altruistic punishment") by third-party subjects who are willing to carry out costly punishment in order to sanction norm violators, even when this violation does not cause any direct loss to them. TPP plays a crucial role in the evolution of societies. It sustains social stability and cooperation, enforces social norms (see for example Gintis, 2000; Bendor and Swistak, 2001; Fehr et al., 2002) and is even considered a cornerstone of morality (Kurzban et al., 2007) . Given this paramount importance of TPP, several experimental studies have tried to contribute to a deepened analysis of the underlying motivations that would activate voluntary TPP and of its variants among cultures. Intercultural comparisons -"even in societies where there is no government, law or police, [that are] more similar to those our ancestors lived in before agriculture" (Marlowe et al., 2008) -and the implementation of realistic scenarios in the lab has allowed for a better understanding both of the socio-demographic contexts in which TPP emerges and evolves, and of its relative effectiveness within different cultures.
The pioneering work is by Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) . They show in the lab that subjects are willing to display TPP when facing fairness norms violation and they also show that higher levels of perceived unfairness imply higher levels of punishment. Shinada et al. (2004) conduct a gift-giving game with both in-group and out-group impartial third-party punishers to investigate whether the 'groupbased nature of cooperation is extended to punishment as second-order cooperation' (Shinada et al., 2004:390) , showing that third parties mostly punish ingroup rather than out-group defectors -that is, insider third parties punish more than outsider third parties. This seems to confirm group-selection theories according to which punishment is a precious resource to promote in-group cooperation and to outcompete against those groups without punishers (Kurzban et al., 2007) . Bernhard et al. (2006) confirm Shinada's result by running experiments among indigenous groups in Papua New Guinea. They find again that third-party punishers protect in-group much more than out-group victims. Within their famous cross-cultural research project, Henrich et al. (2001; find that there is considerable variance in the levels of third-party punishment. Charness et al. (2008) explore the TPP effect in an Investment Game context. From their study, it turns out that TPP improves trust and social outcomes. Following Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) , Ottone (2008) finds that sanctions do not represent the unique reaction of third parties when facing norm violations, but they are part of a more complex and multifaceted pro-social attitude stimulated by peoples' sense of justice. In fact, when introducing the opportunity for the third party to help the victims in addition to the possibility of punishing norm violators, it turns out that both tools are implemented. Marlowe et al. (2008) show that people in larger and more complex societies implement more TPP than people in small-scale societies.
In our paper, we want to pursue the aforementioned line of research regarding TPP by adding a further realistic issue, namely punishment choices in the presence of a further potential third-party punisher ("In-Group Scenario"). Technically, we consider a simple modification of the Third-Party Punishment Game (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004) where we compare one-shot TPP in groups of three (a Dictator, a Receiver, and a potential third-party punisher) and in groups of four (a Dictator, a Receiver, and two potential third-party punishers). This experimental setting allows us to analyze non-strategic insider third-party behavior in a within-group context. 1 On the one hand, this experimental setting is of a conceptual nature which attempts to capture in a nutshell the very essence of TPP in In-Group scenarios. On the other hand, we believe this kind of setting is representative of a typical social interaction in large societies, where TPP in one-shot interactions is much more common (Marlowe et al., 2008) than in smaller environments. Whereas people are unlikely to meet more than once in large societies, the presence of a potential additional third party punisher who observes the norm violation and decides to intervene becomes more probable. Acknowledging, in line with the existing literature, the principal importance of voluntary TPP for the stability of social systems, the question arises as to whether TPP would be robust with respect to an enlargement of the pool of potential altruistic punishers, namely the introduction of a second potential punisher. The relevance of this question is evident because, should the case be that the presence of several potential third-party punishers activates free-riding attitudes, TPP may decline or even collapse altogether. In such a case, it would be naïve to trust TPP efficacy unconditionally. Apart from the contribution by Casari and Luini (2009) , who experimentally test the emotional nature of SPP, the existing experimental literature does not -to the best of our knowledge -address the question as to whether TPP is robust with respect to the presence of a further potential punisher. It is here where we see the contribution of our paper.
The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction (Section 1), we introduce the experimental design and procedure in Section 2. The third section is devoted to the expected results, while the fourth section presents the results. Section 5 deals with the discussion of the results, while Section 6 concludes.
THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The Game. This experiment is designed in such a way that it allows for a comparison of third-party punishment in the Stand-Alone case (i.e., one single potential punisher) and the In-Group case (i.e., two potential punishers). The underlying scenario is that of a Third-Party Punishment Game (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004) . A Dictator Game is played by the Dictators and the Receivers (As and Bs). The potential punishers (the Cs) do not themselves participate in the Dictator Game, but may inflict punishment on the Dictator (the As) following the latter's decision as to how to share the initial endowment with their "game partner" (the Receivers). If punished, the Dictators suffer monetary loss. Punishment is costly both for the As (suffering the punishment) and for the Cs (carrying out this punishment). The Cs have to invest real resources, namely a certain amount of their own financial endowment, for the goal of imposing punishment (in terms of a multiple of the punishment cost) on A; details are given below. Technically, the tool (see Figure 1 ) is a variant of the Third-Party Punishment Game. At the beginning of each session in each treatment, subjects are put into groups and randomly assigned a role (A, B, or C). 2 In the first stage, participant A (the Dictator) and participant B (the Receiver) play a Dictator Game. A assigns a certain portion of her/his original endowment to B; B is entirely passive: s/he receives what s/he is given. In the second stage, in each group participants C get the opportunity to impose a monetary disutility ("punishment") on A. This punishment, available in discrete units, has to be "purchased" by C. It inflicts a purely monetary loss on A (i.e., there is no transfer of the deducted amount to the punisher). Before making her/his punishment choice, each player C is informed that there is a 50% chance that s/he is the only player C in the group (Stand-Alone scenario) and a 50% chance that s/he is in a group together with another player C (In-Group scenario). In the latter case, where we have two Cs, we call them C1 and C2. It is a one-shot game, but the strategy method 3 is implemented at this level. This means that each player C is asked to declare her/his strategy profile before knowing whether s/he is in a group of three or four players and before knowing player A's actual decision. In particular, s/he is asked to declare her/his level of punishment 4 for both cases (Stand-Alone and In-Group) and for each level of transfer from A to B. The level of punishment that will be implemented depends on the number of player Cs in the group and on the actual transfer from A to B. 5 The Treatments. In our experimental design, we also introduce differences in the cost of punishment in order to study the impact of "different price levels" both for individual punishment choices and for In-Group interaction. The experimental design consists of three treatments: 1) the High-Cost Treatment (HCT) where all player Cs are CH types; the Low-Cost Treatment (LCT) where all player Cs are CL types; and 3) the Mixed-Cost Treatments (MCT), where in the Stand-Alone scenario player Cs are a mix of CH and CL types, while in the In-Group scenario one punisher is a CH type and the other one a CL type. After the Cs have made their choices according to the strategy method for all cases, their effective role is randomly drawn and the relative decision implemented. At the end of the game, first order beliefs of players C regarding the expected punishment level by his/her peer player C (the other punisher) if s/he is in a group of four are elicited according to the standard procedure.
The Endowment and the Payoffs. In each treatment, A's initial endowment is 100 tokens, C's initial endowment is 75 tokens, while B's initial endowment is 50 tokens. Player A can choose her/his transfer to Player B from among seven options -0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 or 30 tokens. In the HCT, the cost for all participants C to punish participant A for the amount of 2 tokens is 1 token. In the LCT, the cost for all participants C to punish participant A for the amount 3 Several tests in simple games have not found behavior induced by the strategy method to be significantly different from behavior induced by the standard direct-response method (Charness et al., 2008) . Also in Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) , Henrich et al. (2006) and Ottone (2005; the strategy method was used with regard to third-party punishers' decisions. 4 Our study focuses on monetary sanctions. Consequently, player C's punishment consists of a reduction in player A's payoff. 5 Consider the following -simplified -example. The LCT is implemented. In group 1, during player C's decision stage, player C declares that s/he will spend 10 tokens for each player A's transfer lower than 25 and 0 tokens otherwise if s/he is the only punisher in the group. If it is not the case, s/he will spend 5 tokens for each player A's transfer lower than 25 and 0 tokens otherwise. At this point, player C is informed that s/he is in a group of three players and that A transferred nothing to B. Consequently, according to her/his strategy profile, 10 tokens are subtracted from her/him to punish player A, while player A's payoff is reduced by 30 tokens. of 3 tokens is 1 token. 6 In the MCT, in groups of four subjects, one of the two players C bears the high cost while the other player C bears the low one. Each token value is 0.10 Euro.
In all treatments: 1) subject A's payoff is the remaining sum after her/his transfer to B and the punishment received from player(s) C; 2) subject B's payoff is the sum of her/his initial endowment and the amount received from subject A; player C's payoff is the difference between her/his initial endowment and the sum spent to punish player A. More specifically:
where: t = number of tokens transferred from A to B c = number of tokens spent by C to punish A s = sanction received by player A The way s is computed depends both on punishment return (equal to 3 if player C's type is CL and equal to 2 if player C's type is CH) and on the number of player Cs in the group. In particular: The Procedure. The experiment, run at the Experimental Economics Laboratory (CEEL) at the University of Trento, Italy, was programmed and conducted with the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) . 7 Participants were all undergraduate students of the University of Trento. In each session, participants were split into four groups of 3 subjects (A, B, and C) and two groups of 4 subjects (A, B, C1, and C2). Overall, eight one-shot sessions were run, with a total of 160 participants; namely, two sessions of 20 participants in the HCT and in the LCT, and four sessions of 20 subjects in the MCT. The instructions were read by participants on their computer screen while an experimenter read them out loud. After reading the instructions, but before playing the game, subjects had to answer some control questions to ensure that they understood the rules of the experiment. At the end of each session, subjects were asked to fill out a brief survey to check for socio-demographic data. Each subject participated in one session only and partners' identities were unknown even after the experiment. To guarantee anonymity, subjects received their payment after the experiment. No communication among the participants was allowed. All information concerning the payoff function and the rules of the game was common knowledge. Each session lasted about 60 minutes. Each subject earned on average 7 euros.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTIONS

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In this experimental study, we examine three questions. Firstly, we analyze whether the Cs punish at all and how the level of punishment by the Cs varies as the transfer from A to B increases (so that punishment choices are affected by the perceived level of "unfairness" regarding A's behavior). Secondly, we examine whether third-party punishment is an ordinary good. This would be the case if the amount of punishment decreased when its cost increased. Thirdly, and most importantly, we analyze the impact of an increase in the number of potential punishers on the amount of individually provided punishment.
BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS
Let us turn now to the behavioral foundations regarding the voluntary individual provision of costly punishment. According to the classical economic approach, as based on the Homo Oeconomicus model, potential punishers will not punish. Any positive level of punishment would imply a monetary cost without conceivable monetary benefit (in terms of deterrence or whatever instrumental purpose) in a one-shot scenario. The predicted absence of punishment would hold true in either scenario (Stand-Alone or In-Group). In turn, based on the findings of the existing experimental literature, one would expect some positive degree of punishment. In light of these findings, one would expect "altruistic punishment" to actually occur and to be not infrequent. Since punishment would not buy these individuals anything in terms of monetary benefits, actual punishment choices are a matter of taste. One would expect these "preferences for punishment" to differ between subjects, similar to any other preference.
It seems conceptually helpful to distinguish between two cases of "altruistic punishment," namely, "instrumental" and "emotional" punishment. We consider punishment an "instrumental good" if the utility of an Observer (player i ) is (also) influenced by the level of punishment of the other Observer (player j ). In such a case, player i is interested in seeing the Dictator punished, but this very interest is also satisfied if the punishment is carried out by player j; i can thus derive some utility from the fact that someone else carries out the punishment. The utility of punishment can also be enjoyed by a bystander: punishment "spills over" from one punisher to the other. In contrast, we consider punishment an "emotional good" if no such influence exists. In this case, the utility of punishment (in terms, say, of the punisher's own emotional satisfaction) can only be enjoyed when one carries it out oneself. Punishment by the peer does not matter. We use a simple utility function that reflects the aforementioned framework:
where xi i s t h e m o n e t a r y p a y o f f o f t h e O b s e r v e r i, pi i s t h e e f f e c t o f punishment of observer i and pj is the effect of punishment of Observer j and t is the transfer from A to B. In our simultaneous one-shot experiments, players do not know the real level of pj , but they have only expectations about it. Then, formula (1) becomes:
where E ( ) I j p represents the expected value for player i o f t h e e f f e c t o f punishment of player j .
Then, we express (for each level of t ) our utility function explicitly. We assume that subject i has a quasi-linear utility function, which is linear in subject i 's monetary payoff xi . 8 8 A quasi-linear utility function implies that the level of punishment is not affected by income. We think this is a good approximation for two reasons. First of all, Carpenter (2007) , in a SPP scenario, shows that the demand of pi is positively affected by the income, but it is inelastic. Moreover, our representative player i 's utility depends also on the level of punishment demanded by player j (pj). Obviously, this value is not affected by player i 's income. Casari and Luini (2005, a working paper version of their 2009 paper cited above) use a similar utility function to represent preferences in a one-shot scenario. Equation (2) becomes:
with a budget constraint:
where q is the cost of punishment for player i, y is her/his income, a and b are two parameters: if a > 0 punishment is a good for player i, if b > 0 punishment by player j is a good for player i.
Maximizing our utility function subject to the given budget constraint by means of a Lagrange substitution, we establish the optimal values of pi when player i stands alone (pi S *) and when s/he is in group (pi I *).
The equilibria are:
ASSUMPTIONS
Now to our assumptions. Assumption 1 concerns a general behavioral assumption regarding the relationship between the Dictator's transfer and the respective punishment for all cases of "altruistic punishment." Assumptions 2-6 distinguish between different categories of punishers according to their "punishment characteristics." All of these assumptions provide experimental hypotheses for our experiments.
Assumption 1. The level of third-party punishment decreases as the transfer from the Dictator to the Receiver increases.
This first assumption, pre-supposing the empirical existence of some positive level of punishment, concerns the responsiveness of its incidence to the degree of its underlying "event/act." Assuming the perceived unfairness by the Dictator to be the determining factor of punishment, one would predict that increases in the Dictator's transfer to the Receiver will, all other things being equal, decrease the punishment by the Observer. Such a prediction is also based on the experimental literature (see, for instance, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Ottone, 2008) , which shows that an increase in the level of transfer reduces the level of punishment. In fact, as the level of t increases, we expect a reduction in the level of utility received by punishment. In particular, if a player thinks that the level of transfer is fair, the utility of punishment is obviously equal to 0.
The subsequent assumptions concern different behavioral categories of punishers and specify the respective experimental hypotheses.
Assumption 2. If third-party punishment is a good with a > 0, 9 it is an ordinary good.
There is no theoretical reason to assume that third-party punishment is not an ordinary good. Even if one remained agnostic as to the precise motivation of TPP, one would expect less punishment to be carried out if the cost of doing so increases. Equations (5a) and (5b) show that the level of punishment decreases as the cost of punishment increases. Empirical results along these lines are common in the literature dealing with second-party punishment (Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007) . In the Stand-Alone scenario, Observer i is the only player in the group who is allowed to punish. Expected punishment of Observer j does not exist. Consequently, her/his chosen level of punishment corresponds to her/his desired level of punishment -namely, her/his desired effect of punishment on the Dictator given the transfer to the Receiver. If third-party punishment is an emotional good, player i 's desired level of punishment corresponds to her/his "in persona" punishment. The expected punishment of Observer j -whatever the amount -is irrelevant. A clear consequence is that in the In-Group scenario -if player j provides a positive amount of punishment -over-punishment occurs.
In order to analyze the last three assumptions, we have to consider beliefs about E (pj). First of all, we study the case with E ( )
Assumption 5. If third-party punishment is a mixed good with 0 < b < 1, the punishment of player j influences both the utility and choices of player i. In particular:
1) the level of p i in the Stand-Alone scenario is higher than in the In-Group scenario. That is:
A the sum of * I i p and E ( )
If third-party punishment is a mixed good, the identity of the Observer is not completely irrelevant. Observer i takes into account the expected punishment of Observer j. However, the latter has a lower weight in the utility function of player i than the former. That is, Observer j 's sanction provides a positive utility to Observer i, even if the benefit coming from an "in persona" punishment is still higher. This implies that for each additional unit of punishment provided by player j, player i reduces her/his level of punishment by less than 1 unit. 
If third-party punishment is an instrumental good, the expected punishment of Observer j is a perfect substitute for Observer i 's level of punishment. Observer i is only interested in the result (i.e., the fact that the Dictator is punished to the appropriate extent). The person/identity of the punisher does not matter. This implies that for each additional unit of punishment provided by player j, player i reduces her/his level of punishment by exactly 1 unit.
Assumption 7. If third-party punishment is a positional good with b > 1, the punishment of player j influences both the utility and the choices of player i. In particular:
If third-party punishment is a positional good, not only the expected punishment but also the presence of Observer j is relevant. In fact, if player i loses her/his function as the exclusive punisher in the group, s/he decides to reduce her/his level of punishment more than proportionally. This implies that for each additional unit of punishment provided by player j, player i reduces her/his level of punishment by more than 1 unit.
If player i believes that the other potential punisher does not punish -that is, E ( ) I j p = 0 -we are not able to classify the nature of punishment. The reason for this is that the equilibria in the Stand-Alone scenario and in the In-Group scenario, according to Assumptions 5, 6 and 7, are exactly the same -
Nevertheless, it does not compromise our analysis. In fact, as we will show in detail in the next section, we have only one subject that shows a positive level of b and believes that the other potential punisher does not contribute. 10
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present our main findings. We distinguish between two subsections of results: consistency proofs and original findings. The consistency proofs report the punishers' reaction with respect to: 1) the Dictators' transfers to the Receivers; and 2) the cost of punishing. They represent a sort of robustness check to ensure that our design and our sample provide results that are in line with the existing experimental literature. The latter subsection deals with the novelty of our experiment -an analysis of the nature of third-party punishment. Since we implemented the strategy method at the punishment stage, we obtain data, for each subject, regarding her/his level of punishment for both scenarios (Stand-Alone and In-Group case) and for each possible level of transfer from the Dictator to the Receiver. Consequently, we study eight subgroups of punishment: LT-Stand-Alone, HT-Stand-Alone, LT-MCT-StandAlone, HT-MCT-Stand-Alone, LT-In-Group, HT-In-Group, LT-MCT-InGroup, HT-MCT-In-Group. The former four sub-groups show the level of punishment chosen by Observers when they are supposed to be in groups of three participants in the LCT, the HCT and in the MCT when they bear the low cost and the high cost of punishing respectively. The latter four sub-groups cover the same treatments when the Observer is supposed to be in a group of four.
CONSISTENCY PROOFS
RESULT 1. Third-party punishment occurs and the Observer's level of punishment decreases as the Dictator's transfers increase. Description of Result 1. Our experiment shows positive levels of third-party punishment for all given scenarios, with the average punishment level declining with increased transfers from the Dictator to the Receiver. This result is graphically presented in Figure 2 , while a numeric presentation can be seen in Table 1 . A random-effects Tobit regression of the Observer's punishment on the Dictator's transfer to the Receiver confirms that a positive relation exists between the level of punishment and the degree of unfairness (AGIVES, p = 0.000). RESULT 2. Third-party punishment is sensitive to its cost. Description of Result 2. When the Observer bears a high cost of punishing (HT and HT-MCT), the level of punishment is significantly lower both in the StandAlone and in the In-Group scenario (see Figure 3 and Table 1 ) at each level of transfer from the Dictator to the Receiver. This result is tendentially confirmed by non-parametric tests (see Table 2 for p-values) and by a random-effects Tobit regression (see Table A1 ). 11 Table 2 , we summarize the non-parametric tests we ran to check for the cost effect on player C's level of punishment. For each possible transfer from A to B, we first ran a Kruskal-Wallis test on C's level of punishment to detect differences among subgroups. We discovered some significant differences. Consequently, we proceeded with our analysis by running pairwise tests (MannWhitney). Significant differences were found both in the Stand-Alone and in the In-Group scenario when comparing HT and LT. At the same time, HT-MCT and LT-MCT results are not significantly different from HT and LT, respectively. We want to underline the fact that the regression provides much clearer results with respect to the non-parametric tests. This is probably due to the fact that the tests were run on a limited number of independent observations (14 in the HT and 16 in each of the other subgroups). Interpretation of Result 1 and Result 2. Both of the two aforementioned results are perfectly in line with the experimental evidence obtained in previous works (see, for instance, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Bernhard, 2005; Ottone, 2005 Ottone, , 2008 for Result 1; Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007 for Result 2) . This coincidence guarantees that neither our design nor our sample are affected by structural biases. Moreover, regarding the cost effects of punishment, the experimental literature is scarce and our results, albeit perhaps not a surprise as such, confirm the tentative findings.
ORIGINAL FINDINGS
RESULT 3. The nature of third-party punishment is multifaceted. Overview. This result is threefold. (a) The introduction of an additional potential punisher matters: it reduces, on average, the amount of individually provided punishment. Punishment in the Stand-Alone case is always higher than in the In-Group scenario. (b) Aggregated potential punishment in groups (as the sum of the punisher's own punishment and the expected punishment of her/his peer) is, on average, always higher than the respective Observer's punishment Description of Result 3a. By using the strategy method, we ask each player C for her/his level of punishment with regard to each possible transfer from A to B, both in case s/he is the only punisher (Stand-Alone case) and in the In-Group scenario. A comparison between the Stand-Alone scenario and the In-Group scenario shows that, in all treatments, this value is lower in the presence of a second potential punisher. Figure 2 provides a graphic illustration of this main finding in terms of average punishment: this graph shows that the line depicting the average punishment in the Stand-Alone case line is always above the respective In-Group line. Table 1 presents the same result numerically: average punishment is, for all possible cases, lower in the In-Group column (denoted with "I") compared with the respective Stand-Alone case. A randomeffects Tobit regression confirms this finding (ALONE, p = 0.000), while Wilcoxon tests mostly confirm this difference in three subgroups -LT, LT-MCT, HT-MCT (see Table 3 for p-values). 12 Interpretation. Result 3a allows for the conclusion that punishment is not a purely emotional matter. If an Observer cared only about the intrinsic benefits of her/his own altruistic punishment, s/he would disregard the presence of a further potential punisher. That is, the expected punishment by her/his peer would not matter. The empirical findings give an inverse result, showing that the presence of a second punisher is relevant for punishment choices.
Description of Result 3b. At the end of each session, we elicit subject C's expected punishment by the peer in the In-Group scenario. For each subject, the sum of her/his declared level of punishment in the In-Group scenario (pi I ) and her/his expected punishment by the peer E (pj I ), represents the potential number of tokens subtracted from the Dictator's final payoff in the In-Group scenario (Ai I ). If we compare this aggregate value with the number of tokens subtracted in the Stand-Alone scenario (pi S ) at each transfer level from the Dictator to the Receiver, it turns out that it is significantly higher in all subgroups (see Table 4 for p-values of Wilcoxon tests). 13 These findings are depicted graphically in Figure 4 showing that the "aggregated" In-Group line is always above the Stand-Alone line.
Figure 4: Potential Effect of Punishment
13 Wilcoxon tests on differences between the potential number of tokens subtracted from the Dictator's final payoff in the In-Group scenario (Ai I ) and the number of tokens subtracted in the Stand-Alone scenario (pi S ) are run for each subgroup at each Dictator's transfer. The null hypothesis is that for each player C these values are the same. Interpretation. Result 3b illustrates that (expected) punishment by her/his peer does not fully "crowd out" the Observer's own punishment. If punishment were purely instrumental, the punisher would reduce his/her own punishment precisely by the expected amount of his/her peer's punishment, so that overall punishment (calculated as the sum of the punisher's own punishment and the peer's expected punishment) would remain constant.
However, over-punishment -a level of punishment higher than the desired one 14 -in the In-Group scenario may be due to different reasons. First of all, such over-punishment may imply that third-party punishment is an emotional good. However, we already know from result 3a that this is not the case, since the level of punishment in the Stand-Alone scenario is lower than in the InGroup context. A second reason for such an over-enforcement may also stem from the fact that, for all punishers, 0 < b < 1. This means that punishment by the second Observer works as an imperfect substitute. Finally, Result 3b may be the result of a heterogeneity of the punishers ("multifaceted nature of punishment"). The last mentioned possibility requires closer observation, namely an exact breakdown of punishment pattern to the various types of punishers. This breakdown is given in Result 3c description below.
Description of Result 3c. An analysis of actual punishment choices on an individual level shows that punishers are in fact heterogeneous. A certain number of Observers never punish ("homo oeconomicus"). Among those who do punish, some behave along "instrumental or positional lines" (reducing their own punishment according to expected punishment by the peer), others along "emotional lines" (being unresponsive to the presence of a second potential punisher), while still others exhibit mixed characteristics. Table 5 gives the exact breakdown of the pertinent empirical results.
The average share of those individuals who never punish is 45%. The percentage of those individuals who -at least to a certain extent -carry out TPP amounts to 49%. The residual 6% make unclear or undefined choices. Concerning the different types of punishment patterns, it is possible to distinguish heterogeneous preferences for punishment. Overall, punishment is an emotional good for 10% of the subjects -which is around 1/5 of the punishers. This 10% ignore the presence of a second punisher such that their punishment remains completely unaffected by the appearance of a second potential punisher. Punishment is an instrumental good for 11%. For these individuals, punishment by their peers spills over to their own punishment choices, leading to a full crowding out. Punishment is a mixed good for 25% (which is around ½ of the population of punishers). Their punishment combines elements of an emotional and instrumental good. Consequently, even if there is a spill-over effect, the crowding out is only partial. Finally, 3% of the subjects behave as if punishment is a positional good. For these individuals, sanctioning in group is less relevant than being the only punisher.
Interpretation. Result 3c shows that differences in tastes and preferences also matter for punishment. In general, in our TPP experiment, there are more punishers than non-punishers. Only 10% of our individuals punish without regard to the presence of a possible second punisher. In turn, the presence of a second punisher affects punishment choices, at least to some degree, for 39% of our individuals. This 39% reduce their own punishment efforts in the shadow of a second punisher ("free riding"). "Aggregated" punishment (in terms of the sum of an Observer's actual punishment and his/her estimates as to the punishment by his/her peer), however, exceeds average punishment in the Stand-Alone case. 15 On average, individuals accept an outcome whereby the appearance of a second punisher (potentially) increases overall punishment levels. In this respect, therefore, even based on the individual punisher's own evaluations, the In-Group scenario holds the potential for excessive punishment.
OVERALL INTERPRETATION OF EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS
In this last section, we discuss implications. In our view, the results of our paper are primarily of conceptual importance. On the one hand, our experiments show that average individual punishment in an In-Group setting is systematically lower than in the Stand-Alone case: altruistically motivated punishers, on average, reduce their punishment in the presence of a peer. Hence, free-riding by altruistic punishers on the altruistic punishment by their peers, and possibly an under-provision of privately provided TPP, may occur.
On the other hand, our experiments show the empirically relevant existence of a preparedness of altruistically motivated punishers to accept, in the presence of a peer, aggregate punishment levels that exceed their own punishment in the single enforcer case. Thus, a potential for over-punishment in terms of possibly excessive punishment vis-à-vis the single enforcer case exists. The conceptual implications of our paper are basically twofold. The first one is fundamental as to the ability of TPP to provide the crucial enforcement device for social (and legal) stability, i.e. the "cement of social stability." In this respect, our contribution cautions the optimism of recent literature on the subject. The praise heaped on TPP in the literature as the "golden cornerstone" of spontaneous social order seems to be motivated by the mere existence of the (important) empirical phenomenon of "altruistic punishment." Implicitly, this literature seems not to take into account the potential instrumental nature of such a punishment. In our experiments, four times as many individuals as emotional punishers have not punished at all (genuine homo oeconomicus). The impact of altruistic punishment and its implementation, hence, depends to a considerable extent on the behavior of the residual part of the population (in our results 39%), where individual altruistic punishment is at least partly crowded out by the expected punishment by their peers. The potential for free-riding on altruistic punishment results precisely from this, at least partial preparedness of the individual punisher to account for altruistically motivated punishment by her/his peers. It seems as if neither the rather limited scope of genuine emotional punishment nor the considerable potential for free-riding and the instability of TPP arising therefrom have been fully developed in the existing literature. Our experimental findings, to be sure, do not suggest an overall breakdown of voluntary TPP, but they emphasize the potential fragility of the social and legal stability. The implementation of voluntary punishment depends on the distribution of types within the population. Whereas voluntary TPP does play an important role in the provision of this social stability, it risks being itself unstable and it does not seem to provide the ultimate answer to the problem of social order. Our impression is that too much emphasis has been devoted to the efficacy of a voluntary form of TPP. Its multifaceted nature and the realistic assumption that it should be implemented by more than one potential punisher risk reducing this enthusiasm. However, the positive implication is that the institutional nature of legal punishment may represent the solution. In an institutional framework, judicial activity provides TPP in its purest form, a judge being by definition a person who is not allowed to hold any personal interest in a case. Law allows us to identify who is the person in charge of punishing guilty people and establishes a range of punishment options. Moreover, when more than one judge is involved -to guarantee more control -coordination among all third parties is required. 16 T o s u m u p , w h e n punishment becomes law, all of the problems related to the voluntary nature of TPP are wiped out. At this point, the partially instrumental nature of TPP is a positive issue: the implementation of legal sanctions is not driven by dominant emotional factors. 17 In a sense, our experiment contributes to supporting the relevance and the necessity of institutional legal systems to provide stability.
The second implication concerns "over-punishment." 18 Over-punishment is a complex issue, and we shall confine our analysis to a few of its aspects only. In our paper, we do not discuss over-punishment in terms of an inefficient 16 Lay judges are an example. However, they are not exposed to uncoordinated punishment choices because they render their decisions in an institutionally well-defined framework, requiring "coordinated choices" (i.e., some majority or even unanimity). Still, the potential for some freeriding exists even in this environment, provided there is no unanimity requirement. In cases of a (super-) majority, the situation may well arise that a juror's vote is not decisive. To the extent that he/she can avoid the cost of punishment, by voting guilty, and yet enjoy the benefit of punishment (by seeing the accused sentenced anyhow), he/she has an incentive to follow such a strategy. 17 Since we find that punishers are heterogeneous, we cannot preclude a priori the idea that a sort of selection bias occurs. In fact, it may happen that emotional punishers decide to become judges. This point deserves further theoretical and empirical inquiry.
18 For example, a lynching by the crowd.
duplication of enforcement efforts that may always arise from the uncoordinated enforcement activities of various potential enforcers. Rather, we focus on over-punishment in terms of excessive punishment, i.e. in terms of a potentially excessive sanction. Since the determination of just, fair or adequate punishment is a difficult and inherently unresolved matter, we apply an agnostic ("subjectivist") position. We compare average punishment (in terms of tokens deducted) in the Stand-Alone case with the average aggregated "potential" punishment in the In-Group scenario; "potential" punishment meaning that we do not refer to the actual aggregated In-Group punishment, but rather to the sum of the punisher's own punishment and his/her estimates as to the punishment of his/her peers ("subjective aggregate punishment"). This comparison allows us to see the extent to which individuals, when determining their own punishment levels in an In-Group environment, are willing to accept (aggregate) levels of punishment that exceed their own evaluation of adequate punishment in the Stand-Alone case. Our experiments have shown the existence of over-punishment in this sense. Over-punishment exists because peer-punishment seemingly is, for a relevant group of the population, not a full substitute for one's own punishment efforts. If it were a full substitute, it would fully crowd out an individual's own punishment so that potential overall punishment levels would remain constant. Our results, therefore, suggest the potential for "excessive" punishment in In-Group scenarios.
From an institutional standpoint, the aforementioned findings suggest a case for legal (or social) rules that would limit the potential for over-punishment stemming from the separate action of various enforcers. And in fact, legal systems typically provide for these rules.
With respect to potential over-punishment, the need for legal intervention may, however, be somewhat smaller than it appears at first hand. It seems as if the heterogeneity of punishment motivations works as an implicit mitigating device. Social stability in terms of avoidance of excessive enforcement seems to rest on the fact that, whereas some punishers are willing to accept "over-punishment," others seek to avoid punishment altogether. In this respect too, the population consists neither of "homines oeconomici" nor of "emotional punishers." If the world consisted only of self-righteous enforcers, we would likely run into overpunishment, if it consisted only of narrowly conceived homines oeconomici, into breakdown of any enforcement. The population mix, as it exists in a heterogeneous society, between homines oeconomici who never punish and punishers (of whom some view punishment as an emotional good, others as an instrumental or mixed good), helps to balance out punishment and to avoid over-punishment. Still, there is no inherent mechanism that would ensure the in the case of administrative penal sanctions versus criminal sanctons) or international (additional enforcement by the authorities of a different state). International covenants extend the "ne bis r u l e " b e y o n d t h e t e c h n i c a l boundaries of national procedural systems. Protocol 7, Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights 22 prohibits, with respect to criminal charges in the broad sense, 23 a s e c o n d p r o s e c u t i o n /conviction by any enforcer/court. Article 54 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement ("CISA") applies to cross-border cases within the EU: it hinders the prosecution/conviction by authorities of any other state. 24 
SUMMARY
We have conducted experiments comparing individual altruistic punishment in a Stand-Alone case and in an In-Group scenario. The result is fourfold. Firstly, our experiment confirms the empirical phenomenon of third-party punishment, as well as its positive correlation with the perceived unfairness of the underlying behavior. Secondly, TPP is sensitive to its costs. Thirdly, and most importantly, the introduction of a potential additional punisher reduces, on average, the amount of individually provided punishment. Punishment in the Stand-Alone case is significantly higher than in the In-Group scenario. Fourthly, tastes for punishment differ. A certain number of individuals never punish. Among those who punish, there exists a sub-group of individuals for whom punishment is an emotional good (meaning that their punishment remains unaffected by the appearance of a peer). For a further sub-group, punishment is an instrumental good (meaning that expected punishment by the peers crowds out punishment). For the largest sub-group of punishers, sanctions are a mixed good. Finally, for a small residual sub-group, punishment is a positional good. To sum up, our data suggests individual punishers are heterogeneous as to their individual punishment characteristics and to the degree by which the presence of a second punisher affects their choices. The implementation of punishment depends on the distribution of types within the population. This result is relevant. It allows us to put into discussion the extreme emphasis devoted to voluntary third-party punishment as the "golden cornerstone" of spontaneous social order and to explain why large developed societies need institutional legal systems as the root of stability. 
HT-MCT
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation belongs to the MCT and the Observer bears the high cost of punishing
